On July 21, 2026, ISS STOXX Governance (ISS) announced the launch of its 2026 Annual Global Benchmark Policy Survey. The survey results will inform ISS’s policy development for 2027 and beyond. For the U.S. market, the survey solicits views on director tenure and independence, reincorporations and changes to governing documents, perpetual adverse vote recommendations tied to problematic governance provisions, the prospect of semiannual financial reporting, board responsiveness where no say-on-pay vote is on the ballot, disclosure of long-term incentive performance goals, and discretionary bonus programs at financial services companies. Across all markets, the survey solicits views on slate board elections, director accountability where companies reduce or withdraw climate-related disclosures, and the use of recognized frameworks for nature-related risk disclosure.[1]
For the U.S. market, the survey solicits views on the topics below. Several of these questions are framed jointly for the U.S. and Canada, as noted.
- Director tenure and independence. Tenure is not currently a factor in ISS independence assessments under the ISS U.S. Benchmark policy. The survey asks whether long director tenure should be treated as a material factor that could adversely affect a director’s independence. If so, it asks after how many years a director should generally be considered no longer independent on tenure grounds, and which factors the assessment should weigh, such as the individual director’s tenure, board-level tenure, and the length of overlap with the current CEO or chair.
- Reincorporations and changes to governing documents (U.S. and Canada). The survey addresses situations where a company changes its location of incorporation or amends its governing documents following changes to the corporate law of its existing jurisdiction. It asks how such changes should be weighed under the ISS U.S. and Canada Benchmark policies, given that they can involve both company-identified benefits and changes to shareholder rights, and whether either should carry greater weight.
- Perpetual adverse vote recommendations tied to problematic governance provisions. Some governance provisions are identified as problematic under the ISS U.S. Benchmark policy, such as multi-class structures with unequal voting rights, supermajority vote requirements, and restrictions on shareholder proposals or derivative suits. The survey asks how long directors should remain subject to adverse vote recommendations while such provisions stay in place, and to which directors those recommendations should apply, for example the chair of the committee responsible for governance oversight, all committee members, or an escalating approach.
- Semiannual reporting (U.S. and Canada). The survey asks how shareholders should view a company’s move to semiannual rather than quarterly financial reporting if regulators permit it, particularly since those that choose to move to semiannual reporting would most likely not need shareholder approval to do so. The response options range from treating the change as no concern, to a positive development that may reduce short-termism, to a negative development that may increase volatility and disadvantage public investors, to a change appropriate for some companies but not others.
- Board responsiveness where no say-on-pay vote is on the ballot (U.S. and Canada). The survey notes the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s May 2026 proposal to revise filer classifications, which could exempt many more companies from say-on-pay requirements. It asks how the ISS U.S. Benchmark policy should signal concerns about executive pay when no say-on-pay vote is on the ballot, and which responsiveness threshold (i.e., threshold of votes cast for continuing compensation committee members) should apply when evaluating the board’s response to compensation committee members who received low support.
- Long-term incentive performance goal disclosure. The survey asks whether the risk of competitive harm can be a compelling rationale for not disclosing forward-looking long-term incentive performance targets. It also asks whether that rationale should depend on a commitment to disclose the targets after the award cycle closes, or be assessed case by case, and whether it is less compelling for relative metrics than for absolute ones.
- Discretionary bonus programs at financial services companies. Under the ISS U.S. Benchmark policy, fully discretionary bonus programs are generally identified as a concern in the qualitative pay-for-performance evaluation. The survey asks whether a discretionary bonus program based on a board’s assessment of performance factors should continue to be treated as a structural concern for U.S. financial services companies. It also asks whether disclosures that increase transparency around the use of discretion would change that view.
Across all markets, the survey solicits views on:
- Slate board elections. The survey asks whether electing directors as a single slate, rather than individually, is a governance concern serious enough to justify opposing the directors’ election on that basis alone. It also asks whether that view should depend on whether slate elections are the prevailing practice in the relevant market.
The survey, available here, may be completed on a voluntary basis by institutional investors, public companies, corporate directors, and other interested market participants. The deadline to complete the survey is Friday, August 14, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. ET. As in prior years, after consideration of the survey responses and other key inputs, ISS will open a public comment period for all interested market participants to provide feedback on key proposed changes to ISS’s voting policies for 2027.
[1] The survey solicits views on issues in other markets (e.g., Continental Europe, UK, Asia-Pacific), but the U.S. market is the focus of this post.